G> TROWTH in any field of science is almost always uneven. The past decade, for example, has been a period of turbulent growth in the field of perception, a period in which parallel inquiries in neurophysiology, physics, and psychology have each in turn thrown light upon the nature of the perceptual process, light of such an order as to dazzle us all a bit with respect to the fundamental nature of perceiving. I should like briefly to review some of these developments before turning to the principal topic of this symposium: the problems of sensory deprivation.
Let me consider first the field of physics. The classical metrics of physics up to the end of the 19th century were the centimeters, grams, and seconds of classical mechanics. Until very recently in psychology, From Harvard University. The present paper will appear in Sensory Deprivation and Social Isolation (Harvard University Press), edited by Dr. Philip Solomon of Boston. I am indebted to Dr. Solomon not only for permission to publish the article in PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE where it is our hope that it might reach a wider audience, but also for the many arrangements that he made for those of us who participated in the Symposium on Sensory Deprivation in June, 1958 of which he was chairman and which was sponsored jointly by the Office of Naval Research and the Harvard Medical School.
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VOL. XXI, NO. 2, 1959 our description of ambient stimuli and of their effect at a sensory surface has been couched in terms of this system. The effort, moreover, to construct a set of experiential attributes for any modality has been guided by this classical system of physical mensuration, and it is not surprising that Titchener 17 and later Boring 2 ended with the ensemble of intensity, protensity, quality, and attensity (the last a never-ending source of embarrassment!). Today, physics has revolutionized its way of looking at the physical world of potential stimulation. In quantum theory, for example, one specifies the state of a system and the set of transitional probabilites leading to next states. Emphasis upon probability of events and transitional probability have become central. These developments in physics have telegraphed themselves into psychology principally via the development of the mathematical theory of communication or information theory, an approach to the analysis of the reduction of uncertainty in physical systems that rests upon Boltzmann's insight that entropy in a system is best described as residual uncertainty. The result of all of this ferment in physics is that attention has been focussed on two related and hitherto neglected features of the physical stimulus: first, the set of possible stimulating states that might have oc-curred at any given moment, and, second, the bias in their likelihood of occurrence. The importance of this probabilistic metric for an understanding of the development of environmentally appropriate sets or attitudes will shortly become apparent.
Developments in neurophysiology have also provided a new challenge to the psychologist interested in perception. As in the case of our contact with physics, we as psychologists have been operating until very recently with a 19th or early 20th century conception o£ the nervous system, an image of a switching and transmission system made up of an afferent or sensory side, a central segment, and an efferent or motor outflow. The work of Granit, 7 of Galambos, 5 of Magoun and his associates, (e.g., 11 ), and of Pribram 14 have seriously brought into question whether such a simple inputoutput model corresponds with the findings of electrophysiology over the past decade and a half. Indeed, we know now that even in so simple a case as the flexion reflex of the spinal mammalian cat, close inspection indicates that a third of the fibres in the efferent nerve trunk going to a muscle has nothing whatever to do with motor activity but with the programming or gating of the sensory stretch receptors in the muscle, setting these receptors to feed back to the spinal cord on the afferent side either a lot or a little sensory information about the state of the muscle. And Granit 7 has shown that centrifugal control fibres operate from the center to the periphery in altering the sensitivity of retinal cells to stimulation. Indeed, Galambos has recently shown that fibres of central origin operate outward to the periphery of the auditory system, serving to "turn off" the sensitivity of hair cells in the organ of Corti when attention is turned elsewhere. Some of these fibres have already been traced back as far as the superior olive, and experiments have been done on the effects of severing them, the result of such section being to prevent centrifugal control from operating. Add to this work the continuing experimentation on the boosting operations of the reticular system in facilitating sensory input to the cortex, discharges which, as Lord Adrian puts it, 1 clear the cortex of alpha activity in order to give sensory messages a clear field, and still another blow is struck in the interest of freeing psychologists from the rigid model of neural activity that is a heritage from the early Sherrington. What this work indicates, as Robert Oppenheimer put it in his first William James lecture of last year, is that the price of perceiving anything at all is that not everything is perceived that can potentially be perceived. And so, if you will, the problem for an organism which would hope to minimize the surprise of its environment to a level where he might survive, is to match his programming to the likelihood and significance of events in the environment. Now consider some of the developments in psychology, for we on our part have not been quiet. I want to single out only two of these. The first is the shift in emphasis in the study of perception from a consideration of classical problems of space-timequality organization as so well represented by the work of the Gestalt psychologists to what Prentice 13 has called a functional emphasis. I should take "functional emphasis" to mean that interest has shifted to the manner in which perceiving relates to and is instrumental in the various ongoing enterprises of an organism, whether these enterprises be simply getting around in a familiar environment or as seemingly complex as looking for food or for a mate or for the Holy Grail. What has been healthy about the new emphasis is that, first, it has confused us out of our smug assumption that perception was some sort of fixed relationship between an impinging pattern of physical energy, on the one side, and certain enduring and highly stable properties of the brain on the other, leaving the variability in perception to that favorite American vehicle of variance, the response. The second and more positive effect of the shift in emphasis is that we have been sent scurrying for independent variables that lie BRUNER outside the comforting stimulus metric of centimeters, grams, and seconds.
A second development in psychology, new work on the effects of early experience, brings us to the heart of the problem to which we are addressing ourselves: the development of perception. It is a problem with a tortured background, tortured by the pains of yesterday's metaphysical deadlocks. One such deadlock is the so-called nativist-empiricist controversy which has about it some of the scent of a wrongly formulated dichotomy. I say this unkind thing about the so-called controversy simply because it has had no issue, and because it yields on the very margins where it should stay firm. Nobody in his right mind has ever urged that an organism begins with no built-in equipment for perceiving, nor has anybody been so brashly foolish as to claim that experience has no effect whatever on the nature of what we perceive. If the controversy had any real meaning in the study of space perception, where it originated, it certainly has none in the study of perception generally. Or rather, I should say, it has about the same meaning as a quarrel in physics between those who would proclaim that weight was more important than the force-fulcrum distance in Archimedean Type II levers. It is not a controversy but a question of plotting functions.
For bringing this matter into a proper empirical perspective, we must be grateful for the work of Hebb and his students in investigating the effects of early sensory deprivation in animals. I do not propose to review the work, for it is well known. In general, an impoverished environment, one with diminished heterogeneity and a reduced set of opportunities for manipulation and discrimination produces an adult organism with reduced abilities to discriminate, with stunted strategies for coping with roundabout solutions, with less taste for exploratory behavior, and with a notably reduced tendency to draw inferences that serve to cement the disparate events of its environment such as between the VOL. xxi, NO. 2, 1959 91 light of a candle flame and the likelihood of its burning when you put your nose into it. Add to these reduced capacities-which may indeed be irreversible, although there has not yet been a full scale attempt to provide adequate therapy toward overcoming these deficits-add to these the fact that there seem to be critical periods operative. Unless certain forms of stimulation-cumlearning take place before a certain point in a puppy's life or a rat's life, there appear to be certain very intractable changes.
Let me speculate a little about the meaning of these challenging findings. But before I do, let me remind you of the parallel findings on prolonged sensory deprivation in adult organisms that have the effect of disorganizing cognitive function, upsetting the constancies, even disrupting the perception of continuous contours that extend beyond the immediate focus of attention at the center of the visual field. I remind you of these matters in advance of setting forth some speculations to underline the likelihood that perception and cognitive activity generally depend upon a dynamically stable though ultimately disruptible equilibrium that depends, even in adult life, upon contact with stimulus heterogeneity and a shifting environment. Indeed, even more dramatic evidence is given by Ditchburn and his associates 4 indicating that if a visual pattern is stabilized on the retina such that it is not even displaced by the natural tremor of the eye, it will disappear from view within six or so seconds.
Let me see if I can pull the threads of the discussion together now. To operate effectively in an environment, an organism must develop a model of the environment, and this for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is a way of conserving information in the form of concepts or universals, the means whereby, to use the ancient Aristotelian language, we separate essences from accidents, or in modern terms signal from noise. If you will, the recurrent regularities and the higher probability relationships between and among events are conserved in this model. Given such models -call them trace systems or cell assemblies or templates or whatever term seems most appropriate to your imagery-it becomes possible, secondly, for an organism to extrapolate and interpolate on the basis of partial information, to perform the kind of inference that may be called "going beyond the information given." This is a task that is learned gradually at first and then, to use Lashley's 10 phrase, as the grammatical character of learning develops, proceeds at an accelerated pace as we convert masses of connected or associated events into more highly ordered systems, as when the children in the ingenious experiments of Inhelder and Piaget go from trial and error concreteness in bouncing a ball off a wall at a target to the reorganization of the situation as one in which the angle of incidence and the angle of reflexion are recognized as equal. This kind of learning is neither S-S nor S-R in the usual senses of those shopworn, terms. It consists of a process of organizing "rules" or "transforms" that conserve and represent the redundant structure of the environment.
Without such prior learning, the centrifugal control functions of the nervous system are without a program-speaking now of a program as one does in computer language. A system without a program, without a basis for predicting that certain events are more likely than others or preclude others, has no basis for selectivity toward stimuli. I would make a small wager at this point. Consider the cats in the experiment of Hernandez-Peon et al.
s Click stimulation produces large spike discharges in the cochlear nucleus. If now the click stimulation is continued but some white mice are introduced into the field under a bell jar, the electrical discharge produced by continuing click stimulation is markedly reduced. Attention is directed elsewhere with attendant gating of the auditory system. The wager is this: if cats are reared in a highly restricted sensory environment, one with a minimum of stimulus variation in either the visual or auditory fields, the selective gating found will be considerably less marked than in normally reared cats. The prediction is based upon several considerations about the nature of perceptual development as perceptual differentiation, a point of view most intimately associated with the Gibsons. 6 Continued contact with a rich sensory environment, the view would hold, permits the development of differentiation of spheres of activity, of sensory modalities, of events within modalities. Sensory deprivation prevents such differentiation, prevents the development of selective gating.
This leads to another prediction: part of the process of perceptual development consists of the capacity to utilize cues, to extract information from cue-significate encounters. One of the more interesting forms of information utilization is to be found in the weighing of probable in contradistinction to certain cues, for the process requires a sorting out and evaluation of negative and positive instances. A given sign leads not always but sometimes and in excess of chance to a given significate. To master such cues requires either the gradual buildup of excitatory strength as required by such learning theories as Hull's 9 or Spence's, 16 or it requires the use of a strategy like that proposed by such analysts of the decision process as Marschak 12 or Savage. 15 In the first case, the process would be very slow and informationally very inefficient, particularly if one worked with a two-cue discrimination situation where, say, a white signal led to food 70% of the time and to non-food 30% and a black cue to food 30% and to non-food 70%. In the second, more informationally efficient strategy, as soon as the animal discriminated the difference in the probability of payoff, he would opt for the more probable cue and ride with it. Let us take groups of sensorially deprived and normal animals and set them two-choice discrimination tasks where the two cues lead 100:0/0:100 to their respective consequences, then 30:20/20:80, and finally 70:30/30:70 as in r.he well-known experiment of Brunswik.
differ least on the certain cues, and as one moved in the direction of the equiprobable case, the groups would diverge more and more. The reason for the prediction is based on quite a simple premise. Not only does early deprivation rob the organism of the opportunity of constructing models of the environment, it also prevents the development of efficient strategies for evaluating information, for finding out what leads to what and with what likelihood. And robbed of development in this sphere, it becomes the more difficult to utilize probable than certain cues, the former requiring a more efficient strategy than the latter.
Let me conclude these notes by reference to the problem of transferability in learning. The McGill experiments and those inspired by the work at McGill have given us a striking example of what has been called non-specific transfer of training. Savings effected in learning something new by virtue of having learned something before cannot in such instances be credited to the transfer of specific responses or of priorly established associations. Yet it is precisely this type of so-called non-specific transfer that is perhaps the most typical and the most ubiquitous. It consists of the establishment of models or constructs or concepts that represent the environment in such a way that when one encounters a new task, it is possible to handle it as an exemplar of an old concept in connection with which appropriate responses have already been learned. Such transfer has the function, almost, of saving us from having to do much new learning and it is indeed the case that after a certain age in life, we do indeed get saved from much new learning.
But non-specific or generic transfer also involves the learning of general rules and strategies for coping with highly common features of the environment. And it is here that I think Piaget's vision is the clearest. He remarks upon the fact that cognitive growth consists of learning how to handle the great informational transformations like reversibility, class identity, and the VOL. xxi, NO. 2, 1959 93 like. In his most recent writing, he speaks of these as strategies for dealing with or, better, for creating usable information. I would propose that exposure to normally rich environments makes the development of such strategies possible by providing intervening opportunity for strategic trial and error. Whether failure to master the elements of such strategies for transforming information before a certain period of growth produces an irreversible loss, I cannot say, nor do I have a clue as to why critical periods are so critical. That there is impairment of strategy under a deprived regimen seems, however, to be fairly evident.
One word of conclusion about the effects of early deprivation. Little is served by fighting over the stale battlegrounds of yesterday's theorizing. I remarked in passing that there has been a strong arousal of interest in the manner in which cognitive functioning and perception are shaped by the instrumental role they play in the enterprises of an organism. In the past there have been pleas of protest that this instrumental bedding of perception played no role in shaping its character or laws, that only responses altered by virtue of instrumental requirements. Such a view comes from the ancient and honorable assumption that all there is to perceiving is the pattern of intensities, durations, and sensory qualities. It is obvious that inference is also a formidable factor in perceiving, else there would not be such a huge difference in recognizing the random word yrulpzoc and the fourth-order word vernalit, or frequent and infrequent words would be recognized with equal ease. Inference depends upon the establishment of rules and models, and it also depends upon the development of strategies for arriving at rules and models. I have proposed in this paper that early experience with a normally rich perceptual environment is needed for such learning, that deprivation prevents it.
Let me, finally, explore the implication of work on early deprivation for our un-derstanding of the effects of sensory deprivation on the functioning adult organism. It would seem, first of all, that not only are there critical problems in the development of adequate models of the environment and adequate coping strategies, but that there are also maintenance problems of an order of delicacy that were not even imagined before the pioneering experiments of Hebb and his associates at McGill. In listening to the papers of our symposium over the past several days, I have been struck by not only the need for variable sensory stimulation as a condition for maintaining a functioning organism, but also by the need for continuing social contact and stimulation. We have yet to study the relative effects of each of these sources of maintenance, but it would appear as if they may serve a vicarious function for each other: where social contact is maintained, as in the efforts at Mt. Sinai in New York to keep up the family contacts of children in respirators, the cognitively debilitating effects of reduced stimulation are notably reduced. It would not be unreasonable to guess that social contact provides a symbolic analogue or vicar for sensory intake.
What is this maintenance problem? I would like to suggest that it perhaps relates to a kind of continuing feedback-evaluation process by which organisms guide their correction strategies in perceiving, cognizing, and manipulating their environments. Let me suggest that the unhampered operation of this evaluation process is critical in the continuing adaptation of the organism, both in the development of adequate cognitive functioning, as I have suggested, and in moment-to-moment functioning. Consider the massive effects that occur when the evaluation process is interfered with by various means. Disrupt auditory feedback in speech by the conventional technique of delaying the return of the speech pattern to the speaker's ear by a fraction of a second, and the effect is highly disruptive. Stuttering occurs and the speaker reports a lively discomfort, sometimes bordering on panic. So, too, with the discomfort of a visual Ganzfeld, where virtually all orienting cues are removed and only a white unstructured space remains. Distorting spectacles often have the same effect of disrupting and preoccupying the organism, setting him off on a battle for adequate feedback that makes all else seem trivial. One may suggest that one of the prime sources of anxiety is a state in which one's conception or perception of the environment with which one must deal does not "fit" or predict that environment in a manner that makes action possible. If there is anything to this view of anxiety, then it follows that when one prevents an organism from monitoring the fittingness of his percepts and his cognitive structures, one is cutting him off from one of his principal sources of maintaining adjustment.
The work reported by Goldberger and Holt in this symposium on "individual differences in reaction to experimental interference with reality contact" and also by Bennett on the effect of sensory isolation in high altitude flying suggests that people respond differently to the initial stages of isolation, some finding it exciting and even intoxicating, others, terrifying and disrupting. I do not know what bearing this has on our present problem, save that when one is isolated from external stimulation one is thrown on internal resources, and people differ in the degree to which they live comfortably and confidently with their inner impulses and cognitive models. Over and beyond this important distinction, I would make one other in the form of a guess. It is this. To get any pleasure from being cut off temporarily from adequate evaluation of one's coping, whether by sensory deprivation or by "non-problem drinking" of five martinis, say, suggests that one is able to rely more on criteria of congruence and consistency in testing one's notions about the world, that one is less fearful of errors of overdaring and overgeneralization. The "strategies of evaluation" of such a person will tend to be more nominalistic and relativistic in the philo-sophical meaning of those terms. The person who is more easily thrown off by isolation and sensory deprivation and interference will be more the empiricist and realist, oriented outward for testing ideas. Each will show a different developmental pattern with respect to strategies for dealing with reality. We have seen such differences developing in eleven-year-old children whose cognitive patterns are now being studied intensively by the Cognition Project at Harvard, and as I listened to Drs. Goldberger and Holt reporting their findings, I was tempted to make the guess I am reporting here. Perhaps its only virtue, however, is that it is a testable guess that can be rejected easily!
In conclusion, then, I have suggested that early sensory deprivation prevents the formation of adequate models and strategies for dealing with the environment and that later sensory deprivation in normal adults disrupts the vital evaluation process by which one constantly monitors and corrects the models and strategies one has learned to employ in dealing with the environment.
